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Abstract
We run a randomized controlled experiment in which farmers trained on a new rice
cultivation method (SRI) teach two other farmers selected by us. We nd that farmers invited
to teach others are much more likely to adopt new practices than farmers who only receive the
BRAC training. Teacher farmers are e¤ective at spreading knowledge and inducing adoption.
Incentivizing teachers improves knowledge transmission but not adoption. Matching teachers
with farmers who list them as role models does not improve knowledge transmission and
may hurt adoption. Using mediation analysis, we nd that the knowledge of the teacher is
correlated with that of their student, consistent with knowledge transmission. We also nd
that SRI knowledge predicts adoption of some SRI practices, and that adoption by teachers
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predicts adoption by their students, suggesting that students follow the example of their
teacher. Explicitly mobilizing peer-to-peer (P2P) transmission of knowledge thus seems a
cost-e¤ective way of inducing the adoption of new agricultural practices.
1. Introduction
This paper is interested in peer-to-peer dissemination to promote innovation. We wish to dis-
seminate information about new practices that can be benecial for some individuals. Since
targeting everyone directly is costly, can we train a small number of potential beneciaries and
ask them to train others? This question is of practical relevance for a wide range of appli-
cations: e.g., introduction of new technologies to producers (e.g., Bandiera and Rasul 2006);
dissemination of better business practices to rms (e.g., Bloom et al. 2013; Fafchamps and
Quinn 2018); training workers on rm-specic equipment and practices (e.g., Campos et al.
2017); and introduction of new products to consumers (e.g., Miller and Mobarak 2015).
We focus on a specic case that is easily amenable to experimentation: the introduction
to small farmers of a new way of getting higher yields on an existing crop. The practice we
disseminate does not require additional purchased inputs, which obviates the issue of credit
constraints. But it demands more precise crop management and therefore more visits to the
eld. Adoption is known to be benecial for some producers, but not all (e.g., Barrett et al.
2004, Takahashi and Barrett 2014, Fafchamps et al. 2018).
Focusing on this technology o¤ers many advantages in terms of design. First, the practice
is relevant for millions of small producers facing relatively similar conditions. This ensures that
lessons learned in one place stand a good chance of being replicable elsewhere. Second, small
farmers do not employ permanent workers1 and they provide all the crop management them-
1Although they do occsasionally employ agricultural day laborers.
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selves. This means that we need not worry about the acquired knowledge being embedded in
workers who can leave their employer after the training and benet others. Finally, many inno-
vations benet from network or market externalities, making coordinated adoption essential for
their successful introduction. In contrast, this technology can benet a single farmer irrespec-
tive of what others do. All these features are ideal for a randomized controlled trial, i.e., the
benets from adoption are essentially i.i.d. and impact can easily be assessed by randomizing
the intervention across similar units.
We experimentally investigate two subsidiary questions. First, we test whether we can
improve information dissemination by incentivizing the teacher farmer. As noted by Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995), farmers may not fully internalize the benets they can impart onto others
when acquire new information through learning or experimentation. Inviting trained farmers
to teach others may su¤er from the same problem. Financial incentives have been shown to
be strong motivators of behavior in a variety of contexts (e.g., Ariely et al. 2009; BenYishay
and Mobarak 2018; Duo et al. 2011; Heath 2018).2 By incentivizing teachers we may induce
them to pay more attention to the training and to more e¤ectively disseminate SRI knowledge
to other farmers.
Second, we test whether information di¤uses better from teacher to student when they are
socially proximate. The literature has indeed shown social proximity to inuence peer-to-peer
behavior in various ways (e.g., Bobonis and Finan 2009, Bandiera et al. 2010, Banerjee et al.
2013), including agriculture (e.g., Conley and Udry 2010, Cai et al. 2013, Genius et al. 2013).
By combining the two treatments, we can assess the respective roles of incentivization vs. social
2Other examples of studies examining the e¤ects of nancial incentives include: Bandiera et al. (2007) on
incentives for managers; Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Duo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012), and Lavy
(2002) on incentives for teachers; Gneezy and List (2006) on incentives for workers; Leuven et al. (2010) on
incentives for students; and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) on incentives for children volunteers. In contrast,
Guiteras and Jack (2018) nd that higher incentives do not attract more productive workers in day labor markets
in Malawi.
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proximity. Disseminating health information across castes has for instance been shown by Berg
et al. (2017) to be problematic unless the disseminator is incentivized. Our experiment will tell
us whether a similar e¤ect is observed in agricultural extension.
Agricultural extension has long practiced the model farmerapproach whereby a small num-
ber of farmers deemed more responsive to innovation are trained rst, and then asked to dis-
seminate the innovation to others. Despite its intuitive appeal, it is yet unclear whether this
approach works (e.g., Beaman et al. 2018), under what conditions it can work, and what are
the channels of peer-to-peer dissemination, if any.
We conduct a large randomized controlled trial in Bangladesh in collaboration with BRAC.
The intervention trains farmers in a set of rice growing practices called the System of Rice
Intensication (SRI). Within each study village we let BRAC identify a set of suitable farmers
for rice cultivation and within this set we select a small number of farmers to be trained. These
trainees are then asked to teach two other farmers from the list identied by BRAC. For the
purpose of this paper, we call the trainees teachersand the two selected farmers students.
Unselected farmers are not targeted for training and are referred to as non-students. This
treatment design is randomized across villages, with control villages not receiving any SRI
training from BRAC.
We nd that, compared to control villages, farmers in treated villages are much more likely
to adopt at least some of the SRI recommended practices. Adoption rates are highest among
those farmers trained directly by BRAC, i.e., the teachers. But it is also high among students,
and even non-studentsdisplay an adoption rate signicantly higher than controls. From this
we conclude that BRAC trainees are capable of teaching the new practices to other farmers.
To examine whether the peer-to-peer (P2P) transmission of new practices can be improved
through incentives, half of the teacher subjects are o¤ered a monetary payment conditional
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on the performance of their students at a quiz on SRI knowledge. We nd evidence that
incentivization improves learning. But it has no signicant e¤ect on adoption: point estimates
are in general positive but not statistically signicant. From this we conclude that incentivizing
teachersdoes not signicantly improve di¤usion in our case.
We also investigate whether trainees better transmit SRI knowledge and practices to stu-
dentswho are socially proximate. To this e¤ect, all farmers in the village listed by BRAC
are asked to nominate ve other farmers from whom they would like to learn. We then assign
students to teachers such that half of the students are taught by the farmer they nominated,
and the other half are taught by someone else. Results do not provide evidence that students
matched with a teacher they nominated do better on the test. In fact, they are less likely to
adopt SRI than students taught by someone they did not nominate. From this we conclude
that matching teacherswith people who nominated them does not improve dissemination 
and does not justify the added cost and logistical complexity of the nomination and matching
process.
Finally we perform a mediation analysis to identify likely channels of inuence in the adoption
decision: is adoption correlated with answers to a quiz about the new practices, which would
suggest that formal knowledge of the technology is important; and is adoption correlated with
how closely the trained farmer applies the new practices, as would be the case if teaching by
example increases adoption. We nd that SRI knowledge as assessed in a formal test predicts the
subsequent adoption of certain SRI practices. This suggests that grasping the new practices at
an academic level helps adoption. In addition, we nd that adoption by teachershelps predict
adoption by their students, suggesting that students follow the example of their teacher. This
result is reminiscent of the co-adoption nding of Fafchamps et al. (2018).
The main contribution of this paper is empirical. We complement the literature on tech-
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nology di¤usion along social networks discussed earlier. We also make a small methodological
contribution by showing how to approach the estimation of average treatment e¤ects when
assignment to a treatment within the experiment is partly based on self-reported matching pref-
erences in our case, nominating a farmer as teacher. Such situations arise more frequently now
that researchers are incorporating matching algorithms in their experiments (e.g., Abebe et al.
2018).
2. Experimental design
The experiment was implemented in 100 villages selected from the two districts of Rangpur and
Bagura in Bangladesh. Of these 100 villages, 60 were randomly selected for treatment. The
remaining 40 villages are controls. Selected farmers in treated villages receive a one-day training
session on a rice farming technology entitled SRI cultivation. SRI training focuses on a small
set of simple yet non-traditional practices that are more demanding in management and labor,
but do not require the purchase of additional farm inputs (see Latif et al. 2005; Sinha and
Talati 2007 for evidence on Bangladesh and West Bengal in India).3 In particular, SRI imposes
a specic transplanting time window and emphasizes a wider spacing and di¤erent arrangement
of the transplanted rice.
Treated villages are further divided into two treatment arms of 30 villages each. In Treatment
B villages, teachersreceive an incentive payment; in Treatment A, they do not. The nancial
incentive given to teachers is based on the performance of their students at a quiz.
In each of the 100 villages, about 30 farmers are identied as potential SRI adopters by
BRAC. Criteria for selection are the same as those used by Fafchamps et al. (2018), i.e., owning
3There are six principles associated with SRI, as veried and adapted by BRAC in the context of agro-climatic
conditions in Bangladesh. The six key principles consist of the following interdependent components: early trans-
planting of seedlings (20-days-old seedlings); shallow planting (1-2 cm) of one or two seedlings; transplanting in
wider spacing (25 x 20 cm); reduced use of synthetic chemical fertilizers; intermittent irrigation; and complemen-
tary weed and pest control.
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more than 50 decimals of land (i.e., half an acre)4 but less than 10 acres. All farmers answer
a baseline questionnaire gathering basic information about household composition and farm
assets.
As part of the baseline survey, each farmer 5 is asked to nominate up to ve farmers (from
the set of 30) who can act as their opinion leader or role model for rice cultivation methods and
practices. We then rank each of the 30 farmers in each village based on the number of nomination
received from other farmers. This ranking is used to select 6 teachers for training as follows: four
teachers are selected at random from those with above-median number of nominations; and two
from those with below-median rank. The reason for selecting more trainees above the median
is because we expect them to be better teachers. We account for this stratied selection in the
analysis. The training lasts for an entire day and is delivered by BRAC in the village itself. At
the end of their one-day training, teachers take a quiz of 15 questions testing their knowledge
of SRI. As per standard BRAC practice, all trainees receive a payment of 300 Taka as nancial
compensation for missing work for a day approximately $5.
Of the remaining 24 farmers, 12 are selected to be trained by the 6 teachers. Each teacher
is assigned two students: one who nominated the teacher as opinion leader or role model at
baseline; and one who did not. A priori we expect students to learn better if matched with
a teacher they nominated. The remaining 12 farmers do not receive any SRI training from
BRAC.6 We call these farmers non-students.
Teachers are given the names of the two students assigned to them. They are not told that
one of them nominated them as opinion leader or role model. Teachers are then asked to teach
these two students about the principles of SRI during one week and instructed to convey to them
4A decimal of land is approximately equal to one hundredth of an acre.
5Due to budget constraints, we were unable to collect this information in control villages.
6Although we cannot (and do not seek to) prevent teachers from sharing SRI information with non-students
if they wish to.
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the same information as they received from BRAC trainers. To help them in their task, teachers
are provided with three copies of a short brochure about SRI  of which one copy is for the
teacher and one is for each of their students. All teachers are informed that, at a pre-specied
time and day at the end of the teaching week, their students will be given a short quiz to test
their knowledge of SRI. In the weeks after that, all teachers and students can receive extension
services on SRI from BRAC. Student farmers do not receive a payment for getting training from
the teacher farmers. Certicates are provided to both teacher and student farmers a week after
completing the SRI training. Such certicates are believed to have social recognition (e.g., Islam
et al. 2018) and to encourage learning. Teacher certicates are labeled di¤erently from that of
student farmers.
The 60 treated villages are randomly assigned to one of two teacher treatments. In Treatment
A the unincentivized treatment teachers receive a at payment of 250 Bangladeshi Taka per
student at the end of their teaching week. This payment is made shortly after the students
have taken the quiz, but it does not depend on their quiz performance. In Treatment B the
incentivized treatment teachers receive a payment that depends on the performance of each
of their students on the quiz. For each student, the teacher receives 300 Taka if the student
answers all 15 questions correctly, minus 20 Taka for each wrong answer. If the student responds
less than 5 questions correctly, the teacher receives nothing for that student. Given the average
number of correct answers on the quiz, teachers can expect to receive approximately the same
payment under the two treatment schemes. Teachers are informed of the type of payment they
will receive at the time they are told the name of their two students.7 They are also told that
7More precisely, the experimental protocol instructs the trainers to say the following to the teachers: We will
go to your peer farmers who have been matched with you to teach/train them about SRI. We will pay you after
we ask a similar set of questions to these peer farmers, which we asked to you in the post-training SRI test, based
on the teaching materials given to you to test them about their knowledge about SRI provided by you. Your task
is now to teach these peer farmers about SRI. You can discuss about what you have learned in this training. In
addition, you share one copy of the training materials to these farmers. We advise you not to mention to peer
farmers the payment we will give to you.
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they will receive no payment if their assigned students report not getting any training from
them.
In addition to the core aspects of the intervention described above, we invite teachers to
guess how their two students score on the quiz. This is done immediately after the students
take the quiz and before the students are told their score. If the teacher can guess the number
of correct answers given by each student, they receive an extra 50 Taka per student. They only
receive this amount if their guess is equal to the number of correct answers plus or minus one.
To illustrate, if a student answers 12 questions correctly and the teacher guesses 11, 12, or 13,
the teacher receives 50 Taka and nothing otherwise. This payment depends on their guess,
not on how the student performs on the quiz.
3. Testing strategy
We start by estimating average treatment e¤ects on the main outcome variable of interest,
which is SRI adoption. To measure the extent of adoption by each farmer, we rely on BRAC
sta¤ visits to the elds of each farmer to gauge how closely they follow key precepts of the
SRI approach, such as recommendations regarding the age of the seedlings; the number of
seedlings per bundle; and the spacing of the bundles. BRAC sta¤ers also assess the proportion
of cultivated land on which SRI practices are used, and the total number of SRI principles
applied. BRAC enumerators also provide a summary measure of SRI adoption that combines
all the above. These di¤erent ways of measuring SRI adoption are correlated with each other,
but not perfectly, so that they all capture valuable data variation that can be used to assess the
e¤ect of treatment on adoption. We are interested in nding a dominant pattern in the data.
We rst estimate treatment e¤ects of the four main categories of treated farmers: teachers;
students matched with a teacher they regard as role model (i.e., nominating student); stu-
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dents not matched with one of their role models (non-nominating student); and non-students.
These four groups of treated subjects are compared to farmers in control villages. Formally, we
estimate:
yiv = +
4X
k=1
kTivk + uiv (3.1)
where yiv is an outcome of interest for farmer i in village v, k = f1; 2; 3; 4g denotes the four
possible treatment types, Tivk = 1 if farmer i in village v is assigned to treatment k, and k is
the ATE for treatment k. Note that, by construction, each treatment is mutually exclusive so
that Tivk = 1 for at most one treatment per farmer. In control villages, Tivk = 0 for all i and k.
Having estimated (3.1), we can then test for the pairwise equality of the di¤erent treatments,
e.g., whether k = l for k 6= l.
We know from previous work (e.g., Latif et al. 2005) that, in Bangladesh the use of SRI is
limited. This is also the case for our control farmers: very few apply any of the SRI recommended
practices. Fafchamps et al. (2018) nd that 37% of the randomly selected, unincentivized
farmers who receive SRI training from BRAC adopt some of its practices. We therefore expect
a similar adoption frequency among teachers if teaching SRI to others has no additional e¤ect
on its adoption but a higher adoption rate if it does. Among students, we expect an average
adoption rate equal or below the adoption rate of BRAC trainees  reasoning that farmers
assigned the role of teachers cannot be as good at conveying SRI knowledge as professional
BRAC trainers. Based on previous evidence, we also expect some adoption among non-students
because SRI knowledge seems to circulate somewhat within treated villages. Finally, we expect
more adoption among nominating students, that is, students assigned to a teacher they regard
as a role model.
The main di¢ culty we face in estimating model (3.1) is that di¤erent farmers have di¤erent
10
probabilities of being assigned to the four treatment groups. This is most obvious for teachers:
in each village we select 4 teachers from farmers with number of nomination above and 2 teachers
from below the village median. Hence, teachers are more representative of the above median
farmers. If the probability of assignment to treatment is correlated with responsiveness to that
treatment, a one-for-one comparison with control farmers will mismeasure treatment e¤ects.
To correct for this, we use sampling weights when estimating model (3.1) (e.g., Imbens and
Wooldridge 2009).8
Sampling probabilities also vary for nominating and non-nominating students. First, the
teacher assignment process implies that of the 24 farmers not assigned the role of teachers,
11 are above the median in terms of nominations while 13 are below the median. Secondly,
remember that, by design, we match 6 of the student farmers with a teacher they regard
as role model/opinion leader, and the other 6 with a teacher they did not nominate as role
model/opinion leader. In practice, this is achieved by a sequential algorithm that starts by
randomly sorting the 24 non-teachers and 6 teachers. The algorithm then sequentially picks,
for each teacher, a farmer who nominated him. This is done by going through the randomly
sorted list until one such farmer is found. When all nominating students have been selected
in the manner, the algorithm then looks for non-nominating students. This is achieved in a
similar manner: the algorithm again starts with the rst teacher on the (randomly sorted) list
of teachers, and looks through the 18 farmers remaining on the randomly sorted list for a non-
nominating student for that farmer. The process is then repeated for the next teacher, and so
on until all 6 teachers have been assigned a non-nominating student.
8To illustrate, suppose that teachers below the nomination median adopt SRI with probability x and teachers
above the median with probability 2x. Further assume that, as in our data, control farmers do not adopt. The
true ATE is 0:5x+0:5 2x = 1:5x. In our sample, however, 4 of the teachers are above the median and 2 below.
If we take the sample average of teachers, we get a estimated treatment e¤ect of 2x+42x
6
= 1:66x, which is an
over-estimate. However, if we reweigh the observations by their sampling probability (i.e., their probability of
assignment to treatment), we get 2
6
x
0:33=0:5
+ 4
6
2x
0:66=0:5
= 1:5x QED.
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As is clear from the above description, assignment to various treatments involves randomness
 i.e., the arbitrary order in which individual farmers are considered at the di¤erent steps of
the algorithm. But not all farmers face the same probability of being assigned to each of the
three possible roles i.e., nominating student, non-nominating student, and non-student. This
is because the pattern of nominations varies from village to village, making it easier or harder
at each step of the algorithm to nd a farmer that meets the required criterion. Furthermore,
how easy it is to nd, say, a non-nominating student to match with a particular teacher depends
on which farmers are selected to be teachers, and which farmers are selected to be nominating
students for these teachers, and so on. Given this, it is not, in general, practical to calculate
algebraically what each farmers probability is of being in one of the four possible treated cate-
gories. It is, however, easy to repeat the selection algorithm with a di¤erent random ordering of
farmers to approximate, by simulation, the actual probability of assignment of each farmer to
each of the four treatment categories. To achieve this, we simply rerun the selection algorithm
for each village many times, and we use the simulated frequency of assignment of each farmer
to each of the treatments as approximation for their sampling probabilities.
Figure 1 presents a histogram of relative sampling weights for all farmers in the treated
sample.9 To facilitate understanding, sampling weights have been scaled by actual sample
proportions. This means that a farmer who has a relative sampling weight of 1 for being a
teacher has a probability of being a teacher equal to the sample proportion. A number larger
than 1 means the farmer has a higher than average chance of being assigned the role of teacher,
and vice versa when the number is smaller than 1. As anticipated given the selection rule for
teachers, the relative probability of teacher assignment is bimodal centered on 2/3 and 4/3,
depending on whether the farmer is below or above the median number of nominations. There
9By construction, all control farmers have a sampling weight of 1.
12
is variation in the probability of assignment to di¤erent treatments across farmers in treated
villages. But in all cases the distributions have full support: it is not the case that some farmers
are always assigned to a specic treatment. This means that we can use the inverse of these
simulated assignment probabilities as sampling weights when estimating (3.1) and for conducting
all empirical analysis in the paper.10
Next we compare students assigned to non-incentivized or incentivized teacher in treatments
A and B. Incentivizing teachers is anticipated to increase their e¤ort in transferring SRI knowl-
edge and this, in turn, ought to lead to higher adoption among their students. To test whether
incentivizing teachers increases the transfer of knowledge, we compare the performance of stu-
dents on the quiz between incentivized and non-incentivized teachers:
qiv = + mTivm + uiv (3.2)
where qiv denotes the quiz performance of student i in village v, and Tivm = 1 if student i is
in a village v that was assigned to the incentivized treatment, denoted m. Regression (3.2) can
only be estimated on students and teachers since the quiz was not administered to non-students
in treated villages and to control farmers. Coe¢ cient m hence capture the additional e¤ect of
incentivizing teachers on studentsquiz performance. We also estimate a similar regression to
check whether incentivizing teachers a¤ect their own quiz performance and SRI adoption in
case being incentivized induces teachers to pay closer attention to SRI instruction and hence
learn better. We conduct a similar analysis to compare the quiz performance of nominating and
10Since we know the actual treatment assignment probabilities of each farmer (or can compute them precisely
by simulation), applying sampling weights perfectly corrects for the possibility of correlation between propensity
scores and treatment assignment. To demonstrate this point in our data, we obtain regression estimates that
correct for sampling weights and also include the propensity scores as additional regressors. The purpose is to
reassure the reader that, as should be the case, including propensity scores as regressors adds nothing when
sampling weights are included. Unsurprisingly, these estimates show very little variation compared to those
presented here. They are omitted from the paper to save space.
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non-nominating students, and to compare their adoption rates.
We end with a mediation analysis to investigate the likely channels of causation in our data.
We focus on two channels of particular interest to policy makers: (1) is adoption mediated by
performance on the quiz; and (2) is adoption mediated by teacher example. To investigate the
rst question for treatments A and B, we estimate an SRI adoption regression of the following
form:
yiv = + mTivm + qiv + uiv (3.3)
where, as before, qiv is the quiz score of student i and Tivm = 1 if the teacher of student i
was incentivized. If the e¤ect of Tivm on adoption yiv is through better SRI knowledge, then
including qiv in the regression should soak up much of the e¤ect of Tivm on adoption. We
estimate a similar regression to compare nominating and non-nominating students, in which
case Tivm = 1 if i is a nominating student. We also examine whether studentsquiz performance
is higher when their teacher performed well on the quiz.
To investigate question (2), we follow a similar procedure, replacing qiv with the adoption of
the farmer who taught student i, which we denote by yjiv:
yiv = + mTivm + yjiv + uiv (3.4)
If the e¤ect of Tivm on adoption yiv is through teacher example, then including yjiv in the
regression should reduce the coe¢ cient of Tivm in regression (3.4). By construction, regressions
(3.3) and (3.4) only use observations on students in treated villages only student farmers have
a teacher, and quiz data does not exist for non-students and control farmers.
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4. The data
4.1. Descriptive statistics
We present in Table 1 summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. The rst panel
presents our main outcome variables of interest. The rst two variables measure the performance
of student and teacher farmers on an SRI knowledge quiz administered by BRAC. The quiz is
based on the training materials and is divided into two parts. Part A has 8 questions on the
basic principles of SRI necessary in order to adopt SRI. Part B contains an additional 12 true-or-
false questions covering a range of topics relevant to SRI, but not directly necessary to adopt it.
There is more usable variation in answers to Part A, which is why we focus on those questions
in our analysis. We also construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject responds correctly
to the three main questions on SRI principles. We see that, as could be anticipated since only
teachers receive SRI training directly from BRAC, teachers perform better than students on the
quiz. The di¤erence in performance is signicant at the 1% level.11
Next we present summary statistics on nominations made by fellow farmers. Farmers could
nominate up to ve other farmers in our sample. On average they nominated 4.9 farmers. By
construction, the average number of nomination received equals that of nominations made. But
nominations received are distributed much more unequally: the standard deviation of nomi-
nations made is 0.31 while that of nomination received is 3.85. The minimum of nominations
received is 0 and the maximum is 26, compared to 2 and 5 for nominations made. Nomination
data was not collected in control villages.
We rely on a set of six related measures to capture SRI adoption. The rst measure is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the farmer has adopted at least three of the six major SRI principles
11On average teachers answer 7.5 questions correctly, while students were able to answer 6.7 questions out of
8 questions. Below we discussed in more details about the quiz performance of students and teachers, and how
that correlate with adoption of SRI
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on at least one of their plots. It is based on an assessment conducted in person by a BRAC
extension agent visiting up to 3 plots of land for each farmer. The second measure of adoption
that we use is the proportion of land on which SRI practices are adopted. The next variable
counts captures the number of SRI principles the farmer has adopted, on a scale of 0 to 5.12 The
last three measures are dummies that focus on an individual practice: does the farmer follow
the SRI-recommended age of seedlings at the time of transplanting; the number of seedlings per
bundle; and the spacing between bundles. SRI recommends transplanting earlier and putting
less seedlings per bundle while spacing the bundles more widely. These three simple practices
have been shown to increase rice yields in many countries including in Bangladesh (e.g., Stoop et
al. 2002, Karmakar et al. 2004, Moser and Barrett 2006, Takashi and Barrett 2014, Fafchamps
et al. 2018).
We immediately note a much higher adoption of SRI in treated villages, a point that is the
focus of our remaining analysis. We do, however, also observe some SRI adoption in control
villages. This can arise either because some control farmers, by chance, follow practices that are
observationally similar to SRI. Alternatively, some control farmers may hear about SRI from
farmers in treated villages e.g., farmers who know each other through intermarriage.
In the rest of the Table we report endline values for agricultural performance. Yields are
calculated in Kg per decimal, where a decimal is a Bangladeshi unit of land area equal to 1/100th
of an acre. Output value is given in Bangladeshi Taka per decimal. The same applies for input
costs, labor costs, total costs, and prots which are equal to output value minus total costs.
We note that treated villages have higher yields and prots, an observation we revisit below.
12We did not consider the sixth principle here -mechanical weeding- as BRAC sta¤s could not verify this among
all farmers considering the weeding was done at di¤erent times than the eld visits in many places. In other cases,
we use farmersself-reported measure (whether they used mechanical weeding or not) during post-harvest period.
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4.2. Balance
We check that our di¤erent experimental samples are properly balanced. In the rst part of
Table A1 we start by comparing farmers in control and treated villages. We report the mean
of the control farmers and the average di¤erence with farmers in treated villages together with
the standard error of that di¤erence. To ensure comparability with ATE estimation results, all
reported estimates correct for sampling weights.13 Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. We nd no signicant di¤erence, suggesting balance between control and treated villages
in terms of age, education, and all key baseline agricultural indicators. The second panel of Table
A1 compares farmers in treatment A and B villages  that is, without and with incentivized
teachers. Here too we nd no evidence that farmers in the two categories of treated villages
di¤er at baseline.
In Table A2 we look for balance in baseline characteristics between farmers within treated
villages, depending on which treated category they are assigned to. In all cases we correct
for sampling weights and cluster standard errors by village. We start by comparing teachers
with other farmers. We see that teachers are in general slightly older and better educated than
non-teachers, and they cultivate more land at baseline. These di¤erences, however, are small
in magnitude and not statistically signicant. We similarly nd no statistical di¤erences in
baseline characteristics between students and non-students. When we compare nominating to
non-nominating students, we again nd that none of the di¤erences in baseline characteristics
are statistically signicant. Similar results are obtained if we do not correct for sampling weights.
From this analysis, we conclude that we have satisfactory balance across our di¤erent treatment
categories.
13They are obtained by regressing the variable of interest on a dummy for treatment. The regression corrects
for sampling weights and clusters standard errors at the village level. Very similar results are obtained without
sampling weights.
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5. Econometric results
5.1. Treatment and adoption
We start by reporting coe¢ cient estimates for equation (3.1) in Table 2. The unit of observation
is a plot with up to three plots per farmer14. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level, which also controls for the fact that plot-level observations for the same farmer are highly
correlated. As discussed earlier, the reported results include sampling weights correcting for
variation in treatment assignment probabilities across farmers.15
Estimates are reported for six di¤erent measures of adoption. The rst one, presented in
column 1, is a dummy equal to 1 if the BRAC sta¤ member who physically inspected each
farmers elds reports that the farmer has adopted at least three of the six major principles of
SRI on (at least) one of their plots, and 0 otherwise. Because the dependent variable has been
multiplied by 100, coe¢ cient estimates can be read as changes in percentage points. Adoption
among control farmers is close to 0. The second measure of adoption is the proportion of land
under SRI cultivation. It similarly varies between 0 and 100%. In column (3) the dependent
variable is the number of SRI principles adopted by the farmer. This number varies between 0
(none) and 5 (all). Most farmers adopt partially only. The last three columns of Table 3 focus
on specic SRI practices, namely: the age of seedlings in days (SRI recommends transplanting
rice seedling earlier than what farmers customarily do); the number of seedlings per bundle (SRI
recommends that a fewer number of rice plants be transplanted in the same bundle); and the
distance between bundles (SRI recommends a greater distance between bundles).
14 If there are more than three plots we randomly selected three plots to obtain plot-level information.
15 If we estimate the regression with propensity scores as additional regression, results are, unsurprisingly, vir-
tually identical. We also estimate the regression without sampling weights or propensity score, to investigate
whether propensity scores may be correlated with treatment e¤ects. We nd very little di¤erence between the
two sets of estimates, suggesting that, in our data, variation in sampling weights/propensity scores is not heav-
ily correlated with treatment e¤ects. Finally, we experimented with nearest neighbor matching using baseline
characteristics for control and treated farmers. Results are again very similar, which is not surprising given that
correcting for sampling weights or propensity scores has little e¤ect on results relative to OLS.
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The coe¢ cient estimates reported in Table 2 indicate that receiving the SRI intervention does
a¤ect the practices of all four categories of farmers in treated villages relative to farmers in control
villages. With a couple of exceptions (age and number of seedlings for non-students), all point
estimates are strongly signicant and consistent across adoption measures. We also note that
teachers adopt more than students; students adopt more than non-students; and non-students
adopt more than control farmers; and these di¤erences are also extremely consistent across
adoption measures. We nonetheless nd that, contrary to expectations, nominating students
are, if anything, less likely to adopt than non-nominating students. We revisit this latter point
below.
To see whether these di¤erences across categories of farmers in treated villages are statisti-
cally signicant, we conduct pairwise t-tests on the coe¢ cients estimated in Table 2. Results are
summarized in Table 3. We see that di¤erences across treatment categories are in general statis-
tically signicant. The main exception is the di¤erence between nominating and non-nominating
students, which is mostly negative but non-signicant the only exception is the SRI adoption
dummy, which is signicantly di¤erent at the 8% level.
From this evidence we conclude that villages exposed to the BRAC extension e¤ort do
experience signicant if partial adoption of cultivation practices recommended under SRI.
Adoption by teachers is 70%. This is nearly twice as much as the 37% adoption rate observed
by Fafchamps et al. (2018) among farmers who receive SRI training from the BRAC trainers in
similar areas of Bangladesh.16 This suggests that being invited to teach SRI to others increases
trainees interest in the new practices. Adoption by student farmers  27 to 33%  is 4 to
10 percentage points lower than adoption by unincentivized trainees in the Fafchamps et al.
16 In that experiment, trainees are asked to refer other farmers for SRI training. Fafchamps et al. (2018) nd
that incentivizing referral generates excess SRI adoption among referring trainees. For this reason, we use the
adoption rate of unincentivized, randomly selected trainees, who constitute the most relevant comparison group
for our purpose.
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(2018) experiment, suggesting a remarkable success rate for what is, after all, a cheaper way
of dispensing knowledge. We also nd a non-negligible amount of interest among non-students,
with 12% adopting some SRI practices which again compare favorably to adoption by untrained
farmers in Fafchamps et al. (2018), which is about 7-8% (see their Table 6).
Next, we compare the e¤ect of the di¤erent treatments on agricultural performance. Results
are shown in Table 4. We see that teachers have statistically higher crop output and agricultural
prots than controls. We also nd that student farmers have signicantly higher yields than
control farmers, and enjoy agricultural prots that are 13 to 14 percentage points higher. All
input costs, on the other hand, tend to be lower for teachers and students than for control
farmers, although the di¤erence is statistically signicant only in one case. This conrms that
adoption of SRI is benecial for the average teacher or student farmer. Although estimated
treatment e¤ects tend to be larger for teachers than students, the second panel of Table 4 shows
that none of these di¤erences is statistically signicant. There is also no signicant treatment
di¤erence between nominating and non-nominating students.
5.2. Comparing di¤erent categories of students
We now compare the quiz performance of students falling in di¤erent treatment categories.
Results are shown in Table 5. Performance of the farmer in the quizz is measured on a scale
from 0 to 8. We also report in column 2 a dummy, which is equal to 1 if the farmer answers
correctly all the three main questions that are most relevant for SRI practices.
We see that students of incentivized teachers do signicantly better on the quiz which
is about 40% of the di¤erence between the score of teachers (who were trained directly by
BRAC) and students in the unincentivized treatment. This di¤erence is conrmed in column 2,
which focuses on the proportion of farmers who answer correctly to the questions most closely
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associated with SRI practices: incentivizing teachers increases the proportion of such farmers
by 11 percentage points which is equivalent to 65% of the di¤erence between teachers and
students in treatment A. Put di¤erently, incentivizing teachers closes a signicant fraction of
the knowledge gap between student farmers who did not receive BRAC training and teachers
who did.
Turning to SRI adoption, the impact of incentivization is much less remarkable. In fact, as
shown in Table 6, we nd no e¤ect of incentivizing teachers on studentsSRI adoption. The
Table also reports adoption by teachers who may have responded to the incentive themselves.
If anything, we nd a fall in adoption rate among teachers in treatment B but this di¤erence
is not statistically signicant.
Next we turn to the quiz performance of nominating and non-nominating students. Results
are presented in Table 7. They show no signicant e¤ect of being matched with a role model on
quiz performance: point estimates are positive but not large enough to be signicant. Turning to
SRI adoption, we report in Table 8 the results from a regression analysis including only students.
As before, standard errors are clustered at the village level and sampling weights are used in
the estimation. Results conrm what we already reported from Table 3: if anything, students
are less likely to adopt if matched with a teacher that they nominated as their role model or
opinion leader. This di¤erence, however, is only signicant in the regression for the overall SRI
adoption variable. None of the other adoption regressions returns a signicant coe¢ cient.
From this evidence we conclude that incentivizing teachers has a positive e¤ect on how much
SRI knowledge is conveyed to them. But, contrary to expectations, it does not a¤ect adoption.
We also nd that, contrary to what we expected, being matched with a role model does not
increase knowledge transmission and, if anything, it reduces adoption. Perhaps, as in the old
adage, people should never meet their heroes.
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5.3. Mechanisms: Mediation analysis
The last empirical section of this paper seeks to identify two possible channels by which teachers
a¤ect the SRI adoption of their students: knowledge transmission and example. To investigate
the rst alternative, we start by documenting whether students whose teacher does well on the
test perform better on the test, and whether this correlation is responsible for the e¤ect of
incentivized teachers reported in Table 5. Results are presented in Table 9. We see that this is
indeed the case: the coe¢ cient of teacher performance is positive and signicant whether we use
the test score or the good performance dummy as dependent variables. We also observe that
the coe¢ cient of the incentivized teacher treatment remains basically una¤ected. This suggests
that the e¤ect of incentivizing the teacher does not operate by inducing the teacher to pay more
attention during training and consequently to perform better on the quiz.
Next, we reestimate regression model (3.3). Results are shown in Table 10. The top panel
shows the estimated treatment e¤ect of incentivizing the teacher on di¤erent measures of SRI
adoption, controlling for the farmers quiz score. Performance on the quiz does predict some of
the variation in adoption they are more likely to follow the SRI principles related to age of
seedlings at transplanting and larger distance between seddlings. But including it as a control
does not change our earlier result from Table 6: incentivizing the teacher continues to have no
e¤ect on any of our measures of SRI adoption.
We repeat the same analysis in the bottom panel of Table 10 with being a nominating
student as treatment variable. To recall, we previously found in Table 8 that this treatment is
associated with a 10% signicant fall in our rst SRI adoption measure, and with negative but
non-signicant e¤ects on other adoption measures. This pattern is una¤ected by the inclusion of
the farmers quiz score in fact, estimated coe¢ cients hardly change at all. We repeat the same
analysis using a dummy equal to 1 if the farmer answers the three main SRI questions correctly
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at the quiz. Results, shown in appendix Table A3, are similar to those in Table 10, except
that the dummy has a slightly stronger predictive e¤ect on adoption measures. From this we
conclude that quiz performance is associated with higher adoption of some SRI-recommended
practices, but transmission of knowledge does not seem to be the channel through which adoption
is a¤ected by being assigned an incentivized teacher or a role model teacher.
In Table 11 we repeat the same analysis focusing on the adoption behavior of the teacher
as additional control. Results indicate that adoption behavior by the teacher is signicantly
associated with all but one measure of SRI adoption by their student. The addition of this
variable does not, however, change any of our earlier results on students being matched with an
incentivized or role model teacher.
From this we conclude that SRI knowledge of the student and SRI adoption by the teacher
are both predictors of some dimensions of SRI adoption. But controlling for these channels of
inuence does not a¤ect our lack of positive e¤ects on adoption for teaching incentives and for
teachers as role models.
6. Conclusion
We run a randomized controlled experiment in which farmers who receive SRI agricultural
training are invited to teach what they have learned to two other farmers selected by us. We
experimentally vary these two student farmers such that one farmer nominated the teacher and
other did not.
We nd that, compared to earlier ndings by Fafchamps et al. (2018), farmers invited to
serve as teacherare 33 percentage points more likely to adopt SRI practices than farmers who
receive SRI training from BRAC trainers in nearby villages. We also nd that teacher farmers
are quite e¤ective at spreading SRI knowledge and at inducing SRI adoption: student farmers
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are only 7 percentage points less likely to adopt SRI practices than farmers who receive SRI
training from BRAC in the Fafchamps et al. (2018) experiment. From this we conclude that
BRAC trainees are capable of teaching the new practices to other farmers.
To investigate whether incentives can improve the transmission of agricultural knowledge
and practices, half of the teachers are o¤ered a fee conditional on the performance of their
studentsat a quiz on SRI knowledge. We nd evidence that incentivization is associated with
more transmission of knowledge. But it has no e¤ect on adoption. From this we conclude that
incentivizing teacherson knowledge transmission does not signicantly improve adoption in
our case.
To investigate whether trainees better transmit SRI knowledge and practices to students
who are socially proximate, participating farmers are asked to nominate another farmer whom
they regard as role model. We then assign half of the students to a teacher they nominated,
while the other half are taught by a teacher they did not nominate. We nd no evidence that
matching students with a teacher they look up to improves either transmission of knowledge or
SRI adoption: if anything, nominating students adopt SRI less than students matched with a
teacher they did not nominate. From this we conclude that matching teacherswith people who
nominated them does not improve dissemination and may even hurt adoption.
We perform a mediation analysis to identify likely channels of inuence in the adoption
decision. We rst ask whether adoption is correlated with quiz performance, which would suggest
that formal knowledge of the technology is important. We nd that the SRI knowledge of the
teacher is correlated with that of their student, consistent with the transmission of knowledge
between them (e.g., Oster and Thornton 2012). Results also show that SRI knowledge as assessed
in a formal test predicts the adoption of some SRI practices. This suggests that grasping the
new practices at an academic level helps inducing adoption.
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Finally, we examine whether adoption is correlated with how closely the teacher farmer
applies the new practices, as would be the case if teaching by example increases adoption. We
nd that, for ve of our six measures of SRI adoption, the adoption by teachershelps predict
adoption by their students, suggesting that students follow the example of their teacher.
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                   Figure 1. Simulated relative sampling weights of farmers in treated villages 
 
Note: Sampling weights are obtained by rerunning the selection algorithm for each village 500 times and using 
the simulated frequency of assignment of each farmer as approximation for their sampling probability. To 
faciliate interpretation, sampling weights have been scaled by actual sample proportions. This means that a 
farmer who has a relative sampling weight of 1 for being a teacher has a probability of being a teacher equal to 
the sample proportion of teachers (which is 20% by design). Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of 
sampling weights to all treatment categories for all farmers in treated villages. By construction, all control 
farmers (not shown here) have a sampling weight of 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on key variables
Sample Observation Unit Treated=Control
p-value
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Performance on the SRI knowledge quiz
Score on a scale of 0 to 8 students+teachers farmer scale 0-8 n.a. 6.94 1.24 n.a.
Dummy=1 if answers the 3 main questions correctly students+teachers farmer 0-1 n.a. 88.0% 0.32 n.a.
Nominations by fellow farmers
Number of nominations made treated villages farmer number n.a. 4.92 0.31 n.a.
Number of nomination received treated villages farmer number n.a. 4.92 3.85 n.a.
Measures of SRI adoption (All farmers within the village)
SRI adopted by farmer on at least one plot, as evaluated by BRAC enumerator all plot 0-1 2.3% 14.84 33.2% 47.08 0.00
Proportion of land under SRI all plot 0-1 3.1% 16.41 27.5% 39.57 0.00
Number of SRI principles adopted on plot all plot 0-5 1.37 0.83 2.01 1.17 0.00
Dummy=1 if follows the SRI-recommended age of seedlings all plot 0-1 1.4% 11.62 5.0% 21.79 0.00
Dummy=1 if follows the SRI-recommended number of seedlings per bundle all plot 0-1 15.7% 36.43 32.5% 46.84 0.00
Dummy=1 if follows the SRI-recommended distance between bundles all plot 0-1 3.0% 17.07 20.6% 40.42 0.00
Agricultural performance at endline (All farmers within the village)
Yield all plot Kg/decimal 21.9 5.74 22.9 5.70 0.00
Value of crop output all plot BDT/decimal 735.7 195.26 767.5 193.78 0.00
Input costs all plot BDT/decimal 146.2 35.94 141.8 30.47 0.00
Labor costs all plot BDT/decimal 156.3 127.22 157.5 140.16 0.73
Total costs all plot BDT/decimal 302.5 132.43 299.4 144.75 0.39
Profit all plot BDT/decimal 433.1 208.45 468.1 203.49 0.00
Control villages Treated villages
Source: The data on quiz performance comes from administrative data collected by BRAC training staff using the standard quiz administered at the end of SRI training sessions. Adoption data comes from field 
observations made by BRAC extension agents associated with the research project. SRI adoption variables are based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is 
collected for up to 3 plots. The six major SRI recommendations are: early transplanting of seedlings (20-days-old seedlings); shallow planting (1-2 cm) of one or two seedlings; transplanting in wider spacing 
(25 x 20 cm); reduced use of chemical fertilizers; intermittent irrigation; complementary weed and pest control (mechanical weeding). The first SRI adoption variable equals 1 if at least 3 of the 6 main SRI 
recommendations are adopted by the farmer on any plot of land. The second SRI adoption variable equals the proportion of the farmer's plots on which at least 3 of the 6 main SRI recommendations are adopted. 
The third SRI adoption variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot;  this number ranges from 0 to 5 because one of the six SRI recommendations (using mechanical weeding) is not observed at 
the plot level at the time of field visit. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 1 if the SRI-recommended value for a particular practice is applied on the plot. All adoption variables -- except the 
number of adopted SRI principles -- are expressed in percentages. BDT stands for Bangladeshi Taka, the national currency. 100BDT is worth approximately 1.2 USD. A decimal is a Bangladeshi unit of land 
area equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 square meters). To obtain USD values per acre, divide the reported values by 1.2. Reported p-values in the last column are for a pairwise test of equality of means between control 
and treated observations.
Table 2. Adoption by Treatment Status
Dependent variable is:
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts SRI 
on any plot
Proportion of land 
under SRI
Number of adopted 
SRI principles
Follows SRI's 
age of seedlings
Follows SRI's 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI's 
distance between 
bundles
Treatments:
Teacher 70.15*** 44.98*** 1.32*** 9.39*** 39.62*** 43.54***
(3.22) (3.22) (0.13) (2.17) (4.21) (3.77)
Nominating student 27.21*** 25.75*** 0.63*** 3.28** 14.89*** 16.45***
(3.53) (3.43) (0.12) (1.47) (3.89) (3.08)
Non-nominating student 33.33*** 26.88*** 0.66*** 4.07** 18.68*** 17.04***
(3.45) (3.13) (0.12) (1.61) (4.07) (3.24)
Non-student 12.45*** 12.31*** 0.30*** 0.42 5.56 6.22***
(2.12) (2.29) (0.10) (0.86) (3.57) (1.73)
Control mean 2.51% 3.38% 1.41 1.31% 17.68% 3.73%
Number of observations 7,230 7,659 6,789 6,789 6,789 6,789
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is 
collected for up to 3 plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least 3 of the 6 main SRI recommendations are adopted by 
the farmer on at least one of his three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale 
of 0 to 100. The third SRI adoption variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot;  this number ranges from 0 to 5 because one of the 
six SRI recommendations (using mechanical weeding) is not observed at the plot level at the time of field visit. The last three adoption variables are 
dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-recommendation for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been 
multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 can be read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses 
and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects for likely correlation across plots within farms. All regressions correct for sampling weights. 
Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table 3. Testing pairwise equality of coefficients in Table 2
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI 
distance between 
bundles
Difference between:
Teachers and nominating students 42.94 19.23 0.69 6.11 24.73 27.09
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Teachers and non-nominating students 36.82 18.1 0.66 5.32 20.94 26.5
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Teachers and non-students 57.70 32.67 1.02 8.97 34.06 37.32
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nominating students and non-students 14.76 13.44 0.33 2.86 9.33 10.23
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Non-nominating students and non-students 20.88 14.57 0.36 3.65 13.12 10.82
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nominating and non-nominating students -6.12 -1.13 -0.03 -0.79 -3.79 -0.59
p-value 0.08 0.65 0.71 0.62 0.16 0.85
Number of observations 7,230 7,659 6,789 6,789 6,789 6,789
The values reported in the table are pairwise t-tests for equality of coefficients in Table 2. To recall, SRI adoption variables are based on a field evaluation 
conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up to 3 plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at 
least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one of his three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption 
variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100. The third SRI adoption variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, 
which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-recommended value for a particular practice is applied on 
the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 can be read as changes in percentage 
points. All standard errors were clustered by village, which also corrected for likely correlation across plots within farm. All regressions include sampling 
weights. 
Table 4. Agricultural performance by treatment status 
Dependent variable (in log): Yield Value of crop output Input costs Labour costs Total costs Profits 
Treatments:
Teacher 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.16**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06)
Nominating student 0.04* 0.04 -0.05** -0.05 -0.03 0.13*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)
Non-nominating student 0.05* 0.05* -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.14**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07)
Non-student 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07)
Control mean (in log) 2.62 5.72 3.74 3.68 4.55 5.59
Number of observations 5,831 5,831 5,831 5,540 5,540 5,299
p-value of pairwise coefficient comparisons between treatments:
Teacher vs Nominating student 0.12 0.12 0.31 0.76 0.61 0.47
Teacher vs Non-nominating student 0.21 0.22 0.88 0.97 0.40 0.66
Nominating vs non-nominating student 0.79 0.77 0.48 0.62 0.75 0.77
The unit of observation is a plot. All dependent variables are in log, which means that coefficient estimates can all be interpreted as percentage changes. All 
comparisons are relative to farmers in control villages. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All standard errors are clustered by village, which also 
corrects for likely correlation across plots within farm. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. 
All p-values reported in the second panel of the Table are the result of pairwise coefficient comparison tests between different types of treatment. 
Table 5. Quiz performance for treatments A and B among students and teachers
Comparing students in treatments A and B
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher)
Mean for treatment A students
Number of observations (students)
Comparing teachers in treatments A and B
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher)
Mean for treatment A teachers
Number of observations (teachers)
Quiz performance based on BRAC administrative data. All regressions include sampling weights. Standard errors 
clustered at the village level are presented in in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6.48 0.79
356 356
(0.120) (0.030)
7.39 0.96
0.13 0.00
710 710
Score on a scale of 0 to 8 Dummy=1 if answers the 3 main questions correctly
0.37* 0.11**
(0.210) (0.050)
Table 6. Impact of teacher incentivization on SRI adoption among students and teachers
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI 
distance 
between 
bundles
Comparing students in treatments A and B
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher) 0.35 3.6 0.1 1.77 0.63 8.07
(6.050) (5.920) (0.180) (2.580) (5.920) (5.310)
Mean for treatment A students 32.83 28.2 2.01 4.03 34.95 17.17
Number of observations (students) 1,758 1,858 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657
Comparing teachers in treatments A and B
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher) -4.45 1.58 0.07 -0.39 1.55 3.20
(6.35) (6.31) (0.22) (4.30) (7.07) (7.43)
Mean for treatment A teachers 74.7 47.6 2.67 10.14 55.89 45.7
Number of observations (teachers) 896 944 837 837 837 837
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up 
to 3 plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one 
of his three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100.  The third SRI adoption 
variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-
recommended value for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 
2, 4, 5 and 6 can be read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects 
for likely correlation across plots within farms. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table 7. Performance at the quiz if student is matched with role model
Comparing students by nomination status
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model)
Mean for non-nominating students
Number of observations
Quiz performance based on BRAC administrative data. All regressions include sampling weights. Standard errors clustered 
at the village level are presented in in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.12
(0.080) (0.020)
6.61 0.84
710 710
Score on a scale of 0 to 8 Dummy=1 if answers the 3 main questions correctly
0.02
Table 8. Impact of teacher nomination on SRI adoption
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI 
distance 
between 
bundles
Comparing students by nomination status
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model) -6.11* -1.14 -0.03 -0.78 -3.81 -0.59
(3.430) (2.52) (0.08) (1.57) (2.66) (3.13)
Mean for non-nominating students 36.15 30.55 2.07 5.28 37.24 21.33
Number of observations (students) 1,758 1,858 1,657 1,657 1,657 1,657
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up 
to 3 plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one 
of his three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100.  The third SRI adoption 
variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-
recommended value for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 
2, 4, 5 and 6 can be read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects 
for likely correlation across plots within farms. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table 9. Correlation in teacher and student knowledge
Comparing students in treatments A and B
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher)
Teacher's value of the corresponding quiz performance measure
Number of observations 
Comparing students by nomination status
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model)
Teacher's value of the corresponding quiz performance measure
Number of observations
Score on a scale of 0 to 8 Dummy=1 if answers the 3 main questions correctly
(0.020)
0.14
(0.090)
(0.050)
0.14*
(0.080)
702
702 702
Quiz performance based on BRAC administrative data. All regressions correct for sampling weights. Standard errors clustered at 
the village level are presented in in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.14*
(0.070)
0.32***
(0.110)
0.02
702
0.34*
(0.200)
0.29***
(0.100)
0.11**
Table 10. Mediation analysis of quiz scores
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI 
distance 
between 
bundles
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher) -0.23 3.9 0.1 1.12 0.27 6.99
(6.100) (5.840) (0.170) (2.560) (5.940) (5.420)
Quiz score on a scale from 0 to 8 0.95 -1.68 -0.02 2.04*** 0.18 3.14***
(1.730) (1.510) (0.040) (0.510) (1.570) (1.080)
Number of observations (students) 1,747 1,847 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model) -5.96* -0.88 -0.03 -0.89 -3.6 -0.68
(3.440) (2.540) (0.080) (1.580) (2.670) (3.160)
Quiz score on a scale from 0 to 8 0.99 -1.5 -0.02 2.10*** 0.23 3.44***
(1.730) (1.540) (0.040) (0.530) (1.580) (1.070)
Number of observations (students) 1,747 1,847 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up to 3 
plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one of his 
three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100. The third SRI adoption variable is 
the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-recommended 
value for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 can be 
read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects for likely correlation 
across plots within farms. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table 11. Mediation analysis of teacher SRI adoption
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundle
Follows SRI 
distance 
between 
bundles
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher) 0.38 2.68 0.07 2.27 0.02 7.13
(6.190) (5.750) (0.150) (2.700) (5.650) (5.170)
Teacher's value of corresponding SRI adoption measure 0.05 0.13** 0.23*** 0.08* 0.11** 0.08**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040)
Number of observations (students) 1,669 1,755 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model) -6.54* -2.19 -0.04 -0.73 -3.97 -1.7
(3.570) (2.560) (0.080) (1.670) (2.720) (3.240)
Teacher's value of corresponding SRI adoption measure 0.05 0.13** 0.23*** 0.07* 0.11** 0.08**
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040)
Number of observations (students) 1,669 1,755 1,571 1,571 1,571 1,571
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up to 3 
plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one of his 
three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100.  The third SRI adoption variable is 
the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-recommended 
value for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 can be 
read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects for likely correlation 
across plots within farm. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table A1: Balancedness test on key baseline characteristics
Age of 
household 
head
Years of 
education of 
household head
Cultivable land 
in decimals
Production per 
decimal
Revenue per 
decimal
Input cost per 
decimal
Labour cost 
per decimal
Total cost per 
decimal
Estimated 
profit per 
decimal
Number of 
observations
Balance between farmers in treated and control villages
Mean for control farmers 45.06 5.09 145.70 19.54 641.27 153.56 102.74 256.30 384.98 1200
Difference with farmers in treated villages -0.422 -0.045 -0.187 0.279 9.554 0.441 -2.334 -1.892 11.447 1800
Standard error of the difference (0.587) (0.281) (6.466) (0.985) (31.027) (3.617) (4.091) (5.502) (29.822)
Balance between farmers in villages in treatments A and B (non-incentivized vs. incentivized)
Mean for farmers in treatment A villages 44.55 5.00 143.90 19.34 636.71 156.13 99.42 255.55 381.16 900
Difference with farmers in treatment B villages 0.121 0.102 5.518 0.953 27.956 -4.227 1.962 -2.265 30.222 900
Standard error of the difference (0.843) (0.377) (7.324) (1.146) (35.625) (5.173) (4.753) (6.943) (33.702)
There are 60 treatment villages and 40 control villages. Treatment villages are equally divided between treatments A and B. The reported difference coefficients and standard errors are based on regressions with 
sampling weights and clustering at the village level. Similar results are obtained without sampling weights. Standard errors are presented in in parentheses. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% 
level.
Table A2: Balancedness test on key baseline characteristics within treated villages
Age of 
household head
Years of 
education of 
household head
Cultivable land 
in decimals
Production per 
decimal
Revenue per 
decimal
Input cost per 
decimal
Labour cost per 
decimal
Total cost per 
decimal
Estimated 
profit per 
decimal
Number of 
observations
Mean for non-teacher farmers 44.54 4.964 145.2 19.88 652.80 153.80 99.96 253.76 399.03 1440
Difference with teachers 0.736 0.224 3.477 -0.269 -9.141 0.916 2.067 2.983 -12.124 360
(0.684) (0.257) (5.642) (0.396) (13.239) (2.036) (2.848) (3.567) (12.572)
Mean for non-student farmers 44.84 5.077 147.3 19.87 651.97 154.15 101.84 255.99 395.98 1080
Difference with student farmers -0.546 -0.085 -3.042 -0.113 -2.902 -0.382 -3.647 -4.029 1.127 720
(0.486) (0.221) (4.791) (0.356) (11.799) (1.392) (2.379) (2.931) (11.313)
Mean for non-nominating students 44.42 4.774 140.9 19.50 640.44 153.97 97.22 251.20 389.24 360
Difference with nominating students 0.009 0.287 5.624 0.499 17.100 -0.409 1.926 1.516 15.584 360
(0.897) (0.371) (6.869) (0.507) (16.624) (2.204) (3.499) (4.314) (16.646)
Balance between teachers and non-teachers in treated villages 
Balance between students and non-students in treated villages
Balance between nominating and non-nominating farmers in treated villages
The results use all 60 treatment villages, equally divided between treatments A and B. The reported difference coefficients and standard errors are based on regressions with sampling weights and clustering at the 
village level. Similar results are obtained without sampling weights. Standard errors are presented in in parentheses. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
Table A3. Mediation analysis of good performance on quiz 
Dummy=1 if 
farmer adopts 
SRI on any plot
Proportion of 
land under SRI
Number of 
adopted SRI 
principles
Follows SRI 
age of 
seedlings
Follows SRI 
number of 
seedlings/bundles
Follows SRI 
distance 
between 
bundles
Treatment B dummy (incentivized teacher) -0.51 3.53 0.08 1.26 -0.09 6.92
(6.070) (6.000) (0.180) (2.540) (5.930) (5.380)
Dummy=1 if answers three main questions correctly 6.45 -1.80 0.21* 5.54*** 4.85 11.90***
(6.730) (5.540) (0.110) (1.350) (5.670) (2.870)
Number of observations (students) 1,747 1,847 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646
Nominating student dummy (matched with role model) -5.92* -0.93 -0.03 -0.76 -3.59 -0.47
(3.420) (2.530) (0.080) (1.590) (2.670) (3.150)
Dummy=1 if answers three main questions correctly 6.40 -1.17 0.22** 5.74*** 4.85 12.97***
(6.820) (5.500) (0.110) (1.510) (5.760) (2.790)
Number of observations 1,747 1,847 1,646 1,646 1,646 1,646
The unit of observation is a plot. SRI adoption is based on a field evaluation conducted by a BRAC extension agent. Information on adoption is collected for up 
to 3 plots per respondent. The first SRI adoption variable equals 100 if at least three of the 6 main SRI recommendations is adopted by the farmer on at least one 
of his three main plots, and 0 otherwise. The second SRI adoption variable equals proportion of land under SRI on a scale of 0 to 100. The third SRI adoption 
variable is the number of SRI principles adopted on the plot, which varies from 0 to 5. The last three adoption variables are dummies equal to 100 if the SRI-
recommended value for a particular practice is applied on the plot, and 0 otherwise. Since all dummies have been multiplied by 100, coefficients in columns 1, 2, 
4, 5 and 6 can be read as changes in percentage points. All standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. This also corrects for 
likely correlation across plots within farm. All regressions include sampling weights. Reported p-values: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
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